Skip to content
Modern Summary offers quick, insightful summaries on the la…

MI5's Alert on Beijing's Persistent Spying Efforts in Britain

A surprising connection on the professional network. An offer of employment from a headhunter, probably a female agent, operating from China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 part-time preparing a small number of political reports for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.

It might appear clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's powerful Ministry of State Security still considers it valuable to use recruitment consultants to attempt this – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations on the internet.

Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks

Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an extraordinary scale, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain political, commercial, military and technological secrets. But a fresh initiative aimed at elected officials and Westminster has prompted the spy agency to take further action.

A spying alert was issued on this week via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.

Security Strategy and Legislative Updates

In the typical manner of UK security services, there was no publication of the protective guidance from the agency or the interior ministry. But the agency knew its briefing note would leak once it was sent electronically out to parliament. Republishing it in the media helps the general population more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive intent.

The alert has the impact of flushing out additional details from in and around parliament, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service wants people in public life to understand that just because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are without risk.

Additionally, the internal security service believed to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the burst of activity occur after the awkward collapse of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.

The two had been charged of spying for China – a charge they denied – but failure to complete a trial under the now repealed previous legislation led to concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.

Revised Legislation and China's Strategic Goals

The law has now been changed, and the MI5 slide includes a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if a person engages in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.

An obvious inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in parliament: for a period, in recent years, the Britain's approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.

Cultural Variations and Persistent Cyber Risks

To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Autocratic regimes like China’s export information gathering techniques and the scale of its spy network is enormous, engaging three hundred thousand individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.

The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate people over the long term and sometimes even the agencies have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “China has a low threshold for what information is deemed to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in an individual quickly marginal becomes significant.

Another way to think about the relentless activities at secret intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a threshold below the level of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the another operation breach of countless connected equipment.

Beijing is involved in persistent attempts to identify covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be challenging, to display power and because it can.

By

Lori Kane

A tech journalist and cultural analyst with a passion for distilling complex topics into accessible insights.

Modern Summary

Type to search articles.